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Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously:
The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of
International Law Before U.S. Federal Courts
LuISA ANTONIOLLI*
INTRODUCTION
The issue of pluralistic deficit in decisionmaking processes and in the judi-
cial process covers a wide range of questions, relating pluralism to contexts both
within and outside the state level. Legal pluralism, in fact, is a general phenom-
enon linked to the coexistence of different systems of rules, concepts, and
values, 1 which has always existed, but whose relevance has surely increased in
recent decades, when multifold relationships and interactions increasingly chal-
lenge the possibility of isolating law as a merely national element.
The analysis of the judicial application of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)2
by U.S. federal courts is a specific instance where several important issues concern-
ing the relevance and scope of legal pluralism in the international context arise.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain3 in June 2004 is an
important step in a field that has been rapidly expanding in the last twenty years,
after the groundbreaking decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Fildrtiga v. Pefa-Irala,4 and can be usefully taken as a starting point for the dis-
cussion of the relevance of legal pluralism in U.S. and international law. Although
the central feature of Sosa, and the line of cases decided by federal courts prior to it,
*Professor of Private Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, University of Trento, Italy. This
comment was delivered at a symposium on Back to Government? The Pluralistic Deficit in the De-
cisionmaking Processes and Before the Courts, June 2004, in response to Christiana Ochoa, Access to
U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum for Human Rights Disputes: Pluralism and the Alien Tort Claims Act,
12 IND. J. GLOBAL LECAL STUD. 631 (2005).
1. See Marco Guadagni, Legal Pluralism, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 542 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
3. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). See also Franqois Larocque, Alien Tort Statute Survives the Supreme
Court, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 532 (2004); Anthony J. Sebok, The Alien Tort Claims Act: How Powerful
a Human Rights Weapon is It? The Supreme Court Gives Some Guidance, But Not Much (July 12,
2004), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20040712.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
4. Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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is the use of the ATCA as a means to protect international human rights, its poten-
tial scope is wider because the interplay of international law with U.S. domestic
law envisaged by the ATCA is not confined to a specific subject matter.
I. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: MEANING AND CONTEXT
In order to understand the debate, it is useful to analyze briefly the charac-
teristics of the Act.5 The ATCA was passed by the first Congress in 1879, and its
short and laconic text has been a source of wide discussion and disagreement.
The Act reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." The difficulty in defining the scope of application
of the Act is that for over 170 years it remained virtually dead letter.
6
The historical context in which the Act was enacted is important in under-
standing its significance. During the period of confederation, the Continental
Congress was unable to punish infractions of treaties and the law of nations, and
concerns about this issue were raised during the Constitutional Convention. Con-
sequently, the Framers vested the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over
"all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls, 7 and the
first Congress followed with the Judiciary Act, of which the ATCA was a part. Al-
though there is disagreement about what the original intent of Congress was,
most lawyers agree that at that time, the law of nations was composed of general
norms governing the behavior of national states among themselves, and judge-
made rules relating to the conduct of individuals outside domestic boundaries, as
well as some rules where aspects related to individuals and state relationships
overlapped. Blackstone, for instance, mentions three in his Commentaries: "Viola-
tion of safe-conducts," "Infringement of the rights of ambassadors," and "Pi-
racy."8 It is therefore likely that the first Congress, when enacting the ATCA,
intended to give jurisdiction to federal courts for a limited number of important
violations of the law of nations.
5. For an anthology of articles concerning the ATCA, see THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN
ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999).
6. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755 (stating that "for over 170 years after its enactment it provided ju-
risdiction in only one case").
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1.
8. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 54 (Wayne Morrison ed.,
2001).
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The peculiarity of the ATCA is further evident if one compares it with
other foreign statutes that grant universal jurisdiction over violations of interna-
tional law.9 These statutes, which are more recent than the ATCA, refer to gross
violations of human rights that clearly belong tojus cogens, and provide for crim-
inal sanctions. In contrast, the ATCA is very general in the formulation of the
violations that can determine liability, and limits sanctions to money damages. 0
II. Fildrtiga AND THE USE OF THE ATCA IN FEDERAL CASE LAW
FOR THE VINDICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit breathed new life
into the Act in the Fildrtiga case, which involved the kidnapping, torturing, and
killing of a Paraguayan national by a Paraguayan police inspector in Paraguay.
The court held that the Act created federal jurisdiction for tort actions brought
by aliens, regardless of where in the world the tort occurred."
After Fildrtiga, in cases that are not numerous, but have nevertheless had a
significant impact, the ATCA has been used as an instrument for the protection
of human rights that are guaranteed by international law. 2 These cases have
heterogeneous characteristics, but can be grouped into three categories. 3 The
first group concerns cases where both plaintiff and defendant are foreigners, as
in Fildrtiga, and the parties are linked to the U.S. legal system through personal
jurisdiction-that is, it is possible to serve process on the defendants because
they are physically on U.S. territory. This first group of cases, which includes
9. An example is the Belgian statute enacted in 1993, but later repealed in 2003.
10. See Christiana Ochoa, Access to U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum for Human Rights Disputes:
Pluralism and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005). See generally
Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic
Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
11. See Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). On remand, the district court applied
Paraguayan law to determine liability, but decided to award punitive damages, even though puni-
tive damages were not allowed according to Paraguayan law, because the court deemed such
damages necessary in order to deter torture. See Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F Supp. 860, 864
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
12. See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS 20-23 (1996). There has been significant consistency in the judicial application of the
ATCA because courts have generally endorsed the Fildrtiga approach.
13. See Ochoa, supra note 10, at 633-37.
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Kadic v. Karadzic," concerns blatant violations of international standards of
human rights, such as torture, murder, kidnapping, and genocide, and refers to
defendants who were either acting for the state, or whose actions could be linked
to state action through the doctrine of action under color of law-that is, actions
committed under state auspices or with a substantial degree of cooperation with
a state.'
5
Other cases have enlarged the scope of application of the ATCA by blurring
the requirement that only state action or action under color of law can be a
source of liability. This second category of cases concerns foreign plaintiffs tak-
ing action against private multinational corporations for violations of interna-
tional human rights law.'6 These decisions have been more controversial because
they establish a link between what traditionally has been considered private ac-
tion, and human rights as guaranteed by international law. The original ratio-
nale of these decisions can be found in the doctrine according to which the most
14. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided that, although Karadzic was not officially acting for the state, he was the leader of an un-
recognized government during the war in the former Yugoslavia and received significant backing
from the Yugoslav government. Consequently, he was not to be considered as a private party, but
rather as acting under color of law. Moreover, some violations were, according to international
law, so serious that they caused liability even if they were not related to state action.
15. See also In re Estate of Ferdinando Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
16. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d. Cir. 2000) (action against a multi-
national oil company for complicity in human rights violations and killings in Nigeria during the
construction of a pipeline), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 E3d 470
(2d Cir. 2002) (action against a multinational oil company for human rights violations against in-
digenous people); Roe v. Unocal Corp., 70 F Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (action against a cor-
poration for human rights violations against indigenous people committed by Burmese (now
Myanmar) military who were supervising security during the construction of a pipeline).
Similar human rights suits were filed against several multinational corporations that did
business in South Africa and were linked to the apartheid regime. Some commentators have ar-
gued that these suits could impair the working of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission es-
tablished by the post-apartheid South African government. One of these suits was recently
dismissed by a federal district court in New York.
Previously, action was taken by holocaust survivors against corporations that had profited
from property and labor stolen during the holocaust. Most of these suits were settled out of court.
Compensation was also paid through a large fund established in 2000 by the German government
and German corporations, but this was not related to court settlements. These developments are
discussed in several comments by A.J. Sebok on the Findlaw website. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok,
Un-Settling the Holocaust (Part I), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20000828.html (Aug. 28,
2000); Anthony J. Sebok, Un-Settling the Holocaust (Part I), at http'//writ.news.findlaw.com/
sebok/20000829.html (Aug. 29, 2000).
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outrageous and blatant violations of human rights foreseen by international law
can be sanctioned, even if they are committed by private individuals or entities
acting with no link to states. Nevertheless, some of these cases do establish a link
between the tortious conduct of the defendants and states, but use different stan-
dards than the ones traditionally employed in the analysis of whether an action
is under color of law.
Finally, some recent cases have employed the ATCA in order to establish
the liability of individuals affiliated with U.S. activities for violations of interna-
tional human rights. 7 The United States has immunity under the ATCA, but
states that back U.S. action can be held liable. 8 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain falls
under this category. The case concerned a Mexican citizen, Alvarez-Machain,
who was abducted from Mexico in order to stand trial in the United States for
the torture and murder in Mexico of an agent of the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA); Alvarez-Machain brought suit against another Mexican citi-
zen, Sosa, who helped the DEA in the kidnapping. 9
17. See Papa v. United States, 281 E3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing the District Court's dis-
missal of the ATCA claim and remanding to determine whether the U.S. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service was liable under the ATCA for the killing of a Brazilian citizen during INS
captivity).
18. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(concerning violations of human rights of foreign prisoners under military detention on the U.S.
base at Guantinamo Bay in Cuba), rev'd and remanded by Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004). This
development implied the abandonment of the act-of-state doctrine, the discretionary doctrine of
abstention according to which actions of a foreign government within its territory should not be
subject to U.S. judicial scrutiny. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415-37
(1964) (applying the act-of-state doctrine).
19. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746-47 (2004). Alvarez-Machain stood trial
in the United States, and in 1993, after being acquitted, he sued both Sosa, claiming liability under
the ATCA, and the United States, for false arrest under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
which waives sovereign immunity in suits for personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any government employee acting within the scope of his office or employment.
See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2005). The District Court dismissed the
FTCA claim and affirmed liability under the ATCA. The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit af-
firmed the ATCA judgment and reversed the FTCA claim's dismissal. See Alvarez-Machain v.
United States, 331 F.3d 604, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
clarify the scope of FTCA and ATCA, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003), and fi-
nally decided that there was no governmental liability on the basis of the FTCA because the act
contains an exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for claims arising in a foreign country. See
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). It thereby rejected the Court of Appeals' decision based on the so-called
"headquarter doctrine," according to which, because Alvarez-Machain's abduction was planned
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III. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN Sosa v. Alvarez -Machain AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ATCA
Prior to Sosa, no decision concerning the application of the ATCA had
reached the highest federal court, so the decision by the Supreme Court in June
2004 was an important step in clarifying the content and scope of the Act. In fact,
expectations about how the Court would rule ran very high and were extremely
divided. Some hoped that the Court would declare that, by being merely juris-
dictional in nature, the ATCA did not confer jurisdiction outside the torts rec-
ognized by Congress, strictly limiting the application of common-law rules to
this field. Others hoped for a decision that would keep the doors open for vic-
tims of human rights violations worldwide. As in many other crucial decisions,
the Supreme Court struck a middle ground between these opposite positions. It
recognized that courts can apply actionable international norms independently
from statutory recognition, but at the same time it established very strict criteria
for the exercise of this power.
The Court's reasoning begins with a historical and textual analysis of the
meaning of the ATCA, concluding that
although the [ATCA] is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical ma-
terials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the
moment it became law .... [T]he common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law viola-
tions with a potential for personal liability at the time.2"
and directed by DEA agents in California, the claim did not arise in a foreign country, and conse-
quently the exception did not apply.
Previously there was another series of decisions that reached the Supreme Court, concerning
whether Alvarez-Machain's arrest violated the United States-Mexico extradition treaty. The
Supreme Court decided that the arrest was lawful because a court can try a person for a crime
even though that person has been brought within the court's jurisdiction by forcible abduction be-
cause the treaty contains no explicit prohibition of alternatives to formal extradition procedures.
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663-66 (1992). However, the Court did not
rule out the possibility that Alvarez-Machain's abduction violated general international law prin-
ciples and that he could therefore be protected by a civil remedy. Id. at 669-70.
20. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761. These violations included offenses against ambassadors, violations of
safe conduct, prize captures, and piracy. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective
656
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The Court goes on to say that "no development in the last two centuries has
categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of
nations as an element of common law."'" Nevertheless,
there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discre-
tion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of
action of this kind .... [C]ourts should require any claim based on
the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a spec-
ificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms.22
The great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights requires
that the elements for the judicial establishment of torts actionable under the
ATCA must be strictly defined, so as to keep the door open, but "subject to vig-
ilant door keeping."23 According to the Supreme Court, the international norms
violated must be specific, universal, and obligatory,24 and the application of this
strict standard to the Sosa case implies that Alvarez-Machain does not have a
claim under the ATCA, because under current international law, unlawful and
arbitrary detention have not attained the status of binding customary interna-
tional law.
The decision of the Supreme Court is also based on the analysis of the scope
of federal common law-that is, the extension of the power of federal courts to
shape judge-made rules. The Court starts from the premise that the declaratory
theory of the common law, according to which law is discovered by the court
from a body of preexisting rules rather than created by judges themselves, must
Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 486
(1986); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality ofthe Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text
and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687 (2001-2002); Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International
Law: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 444-48 (2002).
21. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2744. Justice Scalia disagrees with the power of courts to recognize claims
based on international law as an element of federal common law. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769-82
(Scalia, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2761-62.
23. Id. at 2764.
24. See Fiklrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, 726 F2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Estate of Ferdinando Marcos, 25 E3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994).
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be considered obsolete.25 The awareness of the discretionary element in judicial
decisionmaking, and the need to use it carefully, is considered crucial in the area
of private rights deriving from international law: "It would be remarkable to
take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that remained largely in
shadow for much of the prior two centuries. 2 6 The Court remarks that the de-
cision to create a private right of action is generally better left to the legislative
power, and consequently "judicial caution" is required in this area. Finally, the
Court emphasizes that the extension of private causes of action for violations of
international law could impinge on the discretion of the legislative and executive
branches, and could have adverse foreign policy consequences. 27 Again, this re-
quires great caution,28 which leads to the conclusion that, as a rule, judicial cre-
ativity with regard to violations of international law is confined to areas where
there is a congressional mandate.
29
25. Having recognized that courts do make law when they shape common-law rules, the Court
recalls that the current doctrine denies the existence of a federal general common law, but limits
the power to interstitial areas of particular federal interest. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
It is interesting to note that while the Supreme Court blurs the distinction between lawmak-
ing and interpretation in the area of the common law, it still rigidly adheres to the distinction be-
tween making and finding the law when it comes to the issue of treaty-making and treaty
interpretation, which determines the division of tasks between the judicial and the political
branches.
26. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
27. The relevance of political issues related to the discretionary power of the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches is underlined in the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in
the Alvarez-Machain case, where the dissenting opinion by O'Scannlain stated "[w]e are now in
the midst of a global war on terrorism, a mission that our political branches have deemed neces-
sary to conduct throughout the world.... [Tihe implications for our national security are so omi-
nous that I must dissent." Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2003)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). On the contrary, the majority opinion by Judge McKeowen states
that "[wlhatever the contours of the powers of the political branches during wartime or in matters
of national security, the exercise of those powers in the combat against terrorism are not impli-
cated in our analysis." Id. at 608.
28. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775, in which the court dismissed the ATCA claims of Israeli sur-
vivors of a terrorist attack in Israel.
29. This is the case, for example, in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
256, 106 Stat. 73, which establishes a cause of action for torture and extra-judicial killing, subject
to exhaustion of remedies and a 10-year statute of limitations. The Act was passed as an amend-
ment to ATCA.
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IV. THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
U.S. DOMESTIC LAW
International law in the U.S. legal system has a fairly low status." According
to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, all treaties shall be the su-
preme law of the land,3' and the Supreme Court has said that this applies to cus-
tomary international law as well.32 Nevertheless, case law does not consider that
this establishes a monist system with respect to international law-that is, a sys-
tem where international law is part of the domestic legal system and superior to
all domestic sources-but rather treats international law as a form of federal
law, subject to the Constitution, and essentially coequal with federal statutes.
Moreover, even though it is generally recognized that customary international
law ("law of nations" in the terminology of the Constitution) can be part of fed-
eral common law, it does not enjoy a particularly high status, because according
to the standard conception, common law is ranked below all statutory law-not
only the Constitution, treaties, and federal statutes, but according to some case
law and authors, regulations as well.33
Finally, the rule that Congress cannot interfere with rights under treaties, ex-
cept in purely political cases, is limited only to property and other tangible rights
capable of sale and transfer,34 which means that there is a significant possibility
that the legislative power can encroach on rights defined by international law.
This situation leads to a paradoxical result because international obligations
are steadily expanding in number, characteristics, and scope, and because these
obligations are increasingly encroaching on domestic law, "the United States is
an increasingly unreliable treaty partner as a direct consequence of its approach
30. On the role of international law in the U.S. legal system, see generally JOHN M. ROGERS, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW (1999); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (1996).
31. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. Treaties properly made and ratified in the U.S. legal system are en-
forceable in U.S. courts only if they are self-executing, i.e., if they do not require domestic legisla-
tion in order to give legal effect to their provisions. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952)
(citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
32. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
33. See id. (implying that customary international law applies only if there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision).
34. See Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,247 (1872); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
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to those obligations under domestic law." The U.S. approach is characterized by
a "visceral unwillingness to take international law seriously."
35
The sources of international law are treaties and other international agree-
ments, customary law, and general principles of law. While it is relatively easy to
define the content of legal rules belonging to the first source, it is more problem-
atic to define customary rules, which stem from general and consistent state
practice observed and undertaken from a sense of legal obligation. 36 Even more
problematic is isolating rules that are a part of general principles of law, which
are a supplementary source used to fill existing gaps.
37
In terms of the hierarchy of sources, treaties and customary international law
are of equal force. Therefore, in cases where the two clash, the more recent rule pre-
vails. It must be noted that there is a special category of rules of international law,
so-calledjus cogens (peremptory norms)38 that are so fundamental that no state can
derogate from them. Again, although their existence is generally acknowledged,
there is disagreement about which rules fit the category: usually they prohibit at-
tacks on diplomats, acts of genocide, slave trading and slavery, apartheid, torture,
and other gross violations of human rights. Traditionally, treaties and custom gov-
erned relationships between states and did not create enforceable private rights, al-
though there were limited exceptions, such as those referred to by the ATCA.
Recently, the application of the ATCA has become an important element in
the gradual internationalization of U.S. law; its effects must be evaluated in light
35. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS
ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 3, 42-43,45.
36. "The positions or outlooks of particular states, including the United States, should
not be confused with what a consensus of states would accept or support." ... [Tihis
Restatement represents the opinion of The American Law Institute as to the rules
that an impartial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in ac-
cordance with international law.
Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1987)
(quoting the previous edition of the Restatement).
37. Cf. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, § (l)(c) (stating that when decid-
ing international disputes, courts must apply, among other things, "general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations"). The United States accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in 1946 (although it exempted disputes concerning matters essentially within domes-
tic jurisdiction), but in 1985, after its decision in a case brought by Nicaragua concerning the United
States' funding of the contra guerillas, the United States decided to terminate its acceptance.
38. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 53,64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
344,347.
TAKING LEGAL PLURALISM SERIOUSLY
of the dramatic changes in the international legal context.39 In the twentieth cen-
tury, international law has transformed from a body of negative rules of absten-
tion to a much larger and more complex body of positive rules of cooperation.
40
This transformation has affected the boundaries between international law and
domestic law. The scope of international law is constantly changing and enlarg-
ing, taking over issues that were previously considered purely domestic. The ex-
pansion of the scope of international law has also modified the sources of
international law, which range from uniform legislation to principles, modern
contracts, and various forms of soft law. The proliferation of the number of law-
makers and lawmaking processes has influenced enforcement methods, which
now allow states, individuals, organizations, and other entities to invoke inter-
national law in a variety of settings-all on a national, international, and trans-
national level. 4' This evolution has blurred the traditional distinction between
public and private international law, extending public interests into the spheres
of traditionally private matters.
The case law on ATCA that has followed the landmark case of Fildrtiga has
better defined the instances when international law will be applied to domestic
litigation,42 and the margin of discretion U.S. courts may exercise in determin-
ing the content of customary international law.43 In general, the analysis of this
case law shows that courts tend to treat international law primarily as a matter
of domestic law. This has important consequences.
44
As has been previously discussed, in Fildrtiga and some subsequent decisions,
liability on the basis of the ATCA was established only for violations committed
by state officials, or by individuals acting under color of law, later decisions ex-
panded liability to nonstate actors as well, either because the torts were related to
violations where no state action was required, such as genocide, 45 or because they
39. See generally Steinhardt, supra note 35 (using the neologism "intermestic law" to define the
creeping of international law in virtually every field of domestic law).
40. See generally WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1964).
41. See Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary International Law:
The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 240, 241 (2004).
42. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 37 (3d ed.
1996); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 287 (2000).
43. See Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 433 (2004).
44. See discussion infra Part V.
45. The U.S. military tribunal in Nuremberg found private parties guilty of international crimes.
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were linked to different kinds of state action. This trend conforms to emerging in-
ternational standards, which are gradually expanding the liability of nonstate ac-
tors. However, U.S. courts have reached this result by applying the domestic
doctrine of action under color of law, developed previously in the field of anti-
discrimination. The most recent developments extend liability to private, trans-
national corporations, and generate a very relevant area of potential litigation
dealing with violations of international law, particularly human rights law, but
also environmental protection, and others. This means that private parties can
now use U.S. courts to enforce international rules in a variety of areas.46 In this
way, the expanded number of parties that can be held liable, combined with the
expansion of individual rights that are conferred and defined by international law,
opens up an enormous field where national and international law overlap, leading
to greater decentralization in the elaboration and application of international
legal standards-a context in which U.S. courts act as "agents" of the international
order.
4 7
Although the analysis of the case law applying the ATCA shows that "law-
suits in the United States are not some ideal or cost-free approach to the prob-
lem," many commentators believe that:
[i]n the face of the difficulties that inevitably attend such cases, we
must remember that there are few if any real-world alternatives.
There is no global international tribunal to resolve these cases,
and ... victims generally cannot get a fair hearing in their home
countries. Given that reality, the [ATCA] offers a decent option. It
is consistent with the early judgments of the founding generation,
it is consistent with the nation's stated commitment to human
rights, and it is consistent with the obligation of the courts to re-
solve disputes that are brought within the borders of this country.
48
46. See Steinhardt, supra note 35, at 12 (stating that "non-state actors have come to play a quasi-
legislative role in the development of international standards").
47. See generally Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International
Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by For-
eign States Against States, 104 COLtM. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (arguing that "the Constitution vests in
the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over suits brought by foreign states against
States alleging violations of treaties of the United States"). Seealso Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1117-19 (2000).
48. Steinhardt, supra note 35, at 45; see also Ochoa, supra note 10.
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But from the point of view of legal pluralism, how does this reading of ATCA-
related case law fit into the global picture?
V. THE ROLE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT
The expansion of international law related to new lawmaking bodies and
lawmaking processes has led to the creation of a new set of rules, characterized
by the use of vague legal concepts49 that influence national laws in various
ways.5" Examples of such concepts include rule of law, governance, and due pro-
cess. These concepts are so general that they can lead to a variety of different re-
sults, depending on the context; yet they command universal acceptance because
of the importance, and often also the prestige, of the lawmakers who stimulate
or impose the "transplant" (e.g., the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund).5 The isolation of legal concepts from the contexts where they were
originally formed and the corresponding loss of a detailed technical meaning are
two of the main reasons for their success worldwide, because legal concepts can
easily be employed in radically different legal contexts.
Comparative law has extensively studied the reasons and ways in which legal
concepts and legal models circulate,52 as well as the results that transplants pro-
duce in different legal settings. 3 Starting from a neutral point of view in relation
to the issue of legal pluralism versus legal harmonization, comparative law has
shown that there is no direct link between "black letter" rules and the law in ac-
tion: different legal rules in different legal systems can lead to the same opera-
tional results; and conversely, identical rules in different legal systems can produce
49. On the notion of vagueness, see TIMOTHY A.0. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000); TIMOTHY
WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994).
50. See generally Gianmaria Ajani, Navigatori egiuristi. A proposito deltrapianto di nozioni vaghe,
in 1o COMPARO, TU COMPARI, EGLI COMPARA: CHE COSA, COME, PERCHE? 3 (Valentina Bertorello ed.,
2003). On the relationship between international and comparative law, see David Kennedy, New
Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV.
545 (1997); Gianmaria Ajani, Diritto comparato e diritto internazionale, 2001 DIRITTO PUBBLICO
COMPARATO ED EUROPEO 1589 (2001).
51. On the use of "buzz words" (such as "rule of law") outside their own legal context, see Ugo
MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER- IMPERIAL USES OF THE RULE OF LAW, ch. 1 (forthcoming 2005).
52. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 1993); ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (2d ed. 2001).
53. See generally RODOLFO SACCO, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39
Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1991); Rodolfo Sacco, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
171 (2001); RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO (5th ed. 1992).
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different outcomes, depending on a variety of factors that influence the law in
action.54
The development of globalization 55 puts tremendous pressure on institu-
tions and actors to create legal concepts, rules, and models that can be trans-
planted, mainly to achieve harmonization of different areas of law, both at a
regional (such as the European Union) and worldwide level (such as the World
Trade Organization). 56 The circulation of legal models is most intense in the eco-
nomic field (trade, financial instruments, market governance), but other areas
are affected as well, such as human rights and environmental protection. The
impetus that has characterized this new wave of legal transplants, coupled with
the activism of new lawmakers in the international arena, has led to the creation
of a whole set of vague concepts that are employed in radically different con-
texts. Yet, it is often forgotten that when these vague concepts, obtained by a pro-
cess of abstraction, are transplanted into an international or transnational
setting, they interact with a preexisting legal framework, and they can work to-
gether smoothly or create friction between the components of that framework.
Because these transplants are often linked to goals of harmonization or unifor-
mity, little room is left for the appreciation of legal pluralism.
The judicial application of the ATCA by U.S. courts can be read in this
light: international human rights are admitted as actionable rights within the
domestic legal system, but at the same time they are applied by reference to U.S.
law and standards. Although there is much to be said for the opinion that the
chance of obtaining judicial redress is well worth the risk of partial distortion of
legal rules, it is still necessary to emphasize that this can be an instrument for the
imposition of U.S. standards and concepts outside domestic boundaries.
57
54. In Sacco's terminology, these factors are called legal formants.
55. On the impact of globalization on law, see WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL
THEORY (2000); William Twining, Globalization and Comparative Law, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
COMP. L. 271 (1999); MARIA ROSARIA FERRARESE, IL DIRITTO AL PRESENTE: GLOBALIZZAZIONE E TEMPO
DELLE ISTITUZIONI (2002). For a wider evaluation of globalization, see JOERGEN HABERMAS, THE
POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS (2001).
56. In fact, comparative law is also facing difficulties in analyzing the new legal phenomena
linked to globalization because its traditional analysis refers to national-that is, state-law as the
primary level of analysis while the new dynamics mainly span across national borders. For a cri-
tique of this situation, see Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the
Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002).
57. For a critical analysis of the transplant of the U.S. legal model and the elements that have led
to its success, see Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Re-
sistance, INn. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Winter 2003, at 383; MATTEI & NADER, Supra note 51, at chs. 4-7.
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CONCLUSION
Comparative law teaches that the quest for universal concepts and rules can
be misleading, because it starts from the premise that concepts and rules can be
defined in a "legal vacuum," and consequently all that is needed is to carefully
define concepts and rules in order to make them suitable for circulation. Yet, this
method conceals the fact that the use of concepts and rules implies the imposi-
tion of a specific legal model (in this case, the U.S. legal model) to different con-
texts. In fact, rules and concepts are context-bound, and legal pluralism is not
only to be considered a desirable goal, but also as a starting point for analysis.
In cases such as Fildrtiga, where both plaintiff and defendant were foreign,
and the violation took place abroad, the only reason U.S. courts had jurisdiction
was because the defendant could be served with process on U.S. territory. Al-
though most would agree with the results reached by U.S. courts, it still remains
that this leads to the application of U.S. legal standards to wholly foreign legal
situations, justified by the interpretation given by U.S. courts to international
law. It is not impossible to imagine cases where the situation might be less clear-
cut, and imposition of U.S. standards might be perceived as an arbitrary decision
because of the importance and power of the transplanting system.
But why is the U.S. legal system, more than any other legal system in the
world, the target of these kinds of actions? There are a number of features that
make U.S. law unusually pro-plaintiff, and therefore make U.S. courts an at-
tractive forum for litigation.58 First, the U.S. judicial process contains mecha-
nisms that are particularly favorable to claims frequently at issue in ATCA
litigation, such as class actions" and the possibility of obtaining punitive dam-
ages. Moreover, the existence of a large and aggressive plaintiffs' bar, coupled
with the contingent-fee system and a liberal discovery process, makes it possible
(and easier) for a foreign plaintiff to bring a case before U.S. courts-a task that
would be much more difficult in other countries.
The overall success of the intervention of U.S. courts in the field of human
rights litigation should not overshadow the awareness that when U.S. courts are
used as a forum for international litigation, they are interacting with a wider and
58. See WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
STATES (3d ed. 2002); Uco MATTEI, IL MODELLO DI COMMON LAW (2d ed. 2004).
59. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: The New Frontiers
for Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643 (2004).
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more complex legal setting. This awareness should encourage greater caution in
applying domestic concepts and rules, and should be backed by efforts of law-
yers (judges, practitioners, and scholars alike) to develop concepts, rules, and
taxonomies that reflect the international and transnational setting, taking legal
pluralism, rather than universalism, as a starting point."
60. See generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. CoMp. L. 43 (1998).
